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Abstract
We propose a new differentially-private decision forest algorithm that minimizes
both the number of queries required, and the sensitivity of those queries. To
do so, we build an ensemble of random decision trees that avoids querying the
private data except to find the majority class label in the leaf nodes. Rather
than using a count query to return the class counts like the current state-of-
the-art, we use the Exponential Mechanism to only output the class label itself.
This drastically reduces the sensitivity of the query – often by several orders
of magnitude – which in turn reduces the amount of noise that must be added
to preserve privacy. Our improved sensitivity is achieved by using “smooth
sensitivity”, which takes into account the specific data used in the query rather
than assuming the worst-case scenario. We also extend work done on the optimal
depth of random decision trees to handle continuous features, not just discrete
features. This, along with several other improvements, allows us to create a
differentially private decision forest with substantially higher predictive power
than the current state-of-the-art.
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1. Introduction
Information about people is becoming increasingly valuable in the data-
driven society of the 21st century. The ability to extract knowledge from data
allows government and industry bodies to make informed decisions. This can
be anything from monitoring traffic data and predicting congestion or intelli-
gently controlling traffic lights, to reading large amounts of medical data and
finding new disease patterns or predicting patient re-admission probabilities, to
predicting financial market fluctuations. Many fields of science intersect when
mining data; machine learning, statistics, and database systems are intertwined
in order to produce useful, usable information (Breiman, 2001b). “Data mining
algorithms” covers a wide range of possible algorithms; some produce a set of
humanly-readable patterns discovered in the data, some produce a classification
or regression model that enable predictions to be made about the future, and
others detect anomalies in the data. In this paper, we focus on a system that
takes large amounts of data as input, and outputs a classification model. This
model then in turn takes new data as input, and outputs predictions (i.e., clas-
sifications) about how that data should be labeled. Fig. 1 presents a high-level
view of this system.
Unfortunately, sometimes data models are not so easily built and knowledge
is not so easily discovered. Sometimes, the privacy of the people being data
mined needs to be taken into account. Whether it is the government collect-
ing information about its citizens, a business collecting information about its
present and future customers, or a health organization collecting information
about illnesses or treatments, the privacy of the individuals being analyzed is a
human right (UN General Assembly, 1948) that needs protecting. How exactly
we go about protecting the privacy of individuals while also building models and
discovering knowledge is a large question, and one that this paper weighs in on.
We propose a data mining algorithm capable of classifying previously unseen
data with high accuracy, built in a way that protects the privacy of every single
person recorded in the training data.
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Figure 1: A high-level diagram of a data mining algorithm building a classification model
from data.
Sometimes data is available to the public, such as through a government
project like a census. Other data is collected and owned by businesses, where
employees have access to it. In both cases, data subjects feel more comfortable if
they know that personally-identifying information cannot be accessed by anyone
without their explicit permission. In some cases the government may mandate
privacy protections; in other cases, businesses may want to offer privacy protec-
tions to gain financial advantages, by encouraging more data subjects to provide
their information. Differential privacy (Dwork, 2006; Dwork & Roth, 2013) of-
fers a way for both governments and businesses to guarantee privacy protections
to every individual person who has information in a dataset. It is through the
framework of differential privacy that our proposals are designed, taking ad-
vantage of the privacy guarantees it can make to each individual person in a
dataset.
Fig. 2 presents a high-level view of the pipeline used by differential privacy;
an algorithm (henceforth generalized to “the user”) submits a query to the
dataset, the dataset calculates the answer to the query, and then a differential
privacy mechanism modifies the answer in a way that makes it mathematically
impossible to detect if any specific individual is in the dataset or not. The
differentially-private output is then returned to the user, and can be used in
whatever calculations the user wishes at no further privacy cost. In this system
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(visualized in Fig. 2), differential privacy does not need to be considered when
using the final model; its job is done. Different implementations of differen-
tial privacy may add more or less noise to the answer, outputting answers that
are closer or further from the true answer. We propose a new implementation
of differential privacy that is designed for a specific data mining scenario: de-
cision trees (Breiman et al., 1984; Han et al., 2006). By taking advantage of
what makes decision trees different from generic queries, we are able to pro-
duce an ensemble of decision trees (i.e., a decision forest) that can classify un-
seen data with substantially higher accuracy than the current state-of-the-art
in differentially private decision trees and forests (Friedman & Schuster, 2010;
Jagannathan et al., 2012, 2013; Fletcher & Islam, 2015a,b; Mohammed et al.,
2015; Rana et al., 2016).
Out of the possible classification algorithms (Han et al., 2006) that could
be used to learn from data, decision trees are a good choice for minimizing
the drawbacks of providing differential privacy. The main factors that dictate
the impact of differential privacy on a classifier are: (a) the size of the privacy
budget; (b) the number of queries that are required to build the classifier; and
(c) the sensitivity of those queries to small changes in the data. (a) The size
of the budget is outside the control of the user; all a classifier can aim to do
is produce high-quality predictions with as small a budget as possible. Given
a reasonably large dataset, we achieve high accuracy with a budget as small
as ǫ = 0.1. (b) The number of queries dictates how much the budget needs to
be divided up. Unless the queries are applied to disjoint subsets of the data,
they compose and each costs a portion of the budget. This is something we
can control, and our algorithm is built using the absolute minimum: one query,
repeated across many disjoint subsets of the data, each able to use the entire
privacy budget. (c) Finally, the impact of differential privacy is dictated by the
sensitivity of the queries. Our work is the first to apply the concept of smooth
sensitivity to decision trees. We demonstrate that our single query is often
orders of magnitude less sensitive than the queries used by other differentially
private decision trees, and equally sensitive in the worst-case scenario.
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Figure 2: A high-level diagram of a data mining algorithm interfacing with private data,
using differential privacy (DP). An untrusted user submits queries to a private data source
and receives differentially-private answers.
Additionally, the observations we make and the theorems we prove are not
limited to decision trees, but can be used in any differentially-private scenario
that aims to output discrete answers to queries about the most or least frequent
item in a set.
1.1. Problem Statement
A data owner possesses a two-dimensional dataset x of n records (i.e., tuples,
rows) and m features (i.e., attributes, columns). We assume that the feature
schema is publicly available, including the domain of each of the features. The
data owner provides an untrusted user with limited access to the data, giving the
user a specific “privacy budget” ǫ to work with. Each time the user queries the
dataset with some function f(x), an amount of the privacy budget is spent
depending on how invasive the query was to the privacy of the individuals
described in the dataset. Once all the privacy budget is spent, the user loses
access to the data forever. The user may have any number of specific goals,
but in general they are trying to discover as much knowledge as they can with
the budget they are given. Note that other research has explored a different
scenario where the data owner wishes to publish a differentially-private version
of their dataset to the public (Blum et al., 2013; Li et al., 2014), with some using
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decision trees to do so (Mohammed et al., 2011). This scenario is different from
the one we address, where a data mining algorithm accesses the private data
directly.
We use strong differential privacy, with no additional assumptions about the
data. Nor do we use a non-zero δ when considering the more general (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy (Dwork & Roth, 2013), or otherwise weaken the definition
(Rana et al., 2016).
1.2. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a differentially-private decision forest algorithm
that makes very efficient use of the privacy budget ǫ to output a classifier with
high prediction accuracy. We achieve this by proposing a query in Section 4.1
that outputs the most frequent label in some subset xi of the data with high
probability, and using this query in each leaf node of all the trees in a forest. We
prove that this query has low sensitivity, making it reliable even without a large
privacy budget. This proof is generalized to the non-binary case, and tested on
several datasets that have more than two class labels. It is also generalized to
any scenario where a differentially private query aims to output the most (or
least) frequent item in a set.
We also extend the work done by Fan et al. (2003), where combinatorial
reasoning is used to calculate the optimal depth of the decision trees. This work
was only applicable when all the features were discrete; we extend it by proving
the optimal tree depth needed for continuous features in Section 4.3.
The reliability and accuracy of our differentially-private decision forest is
further improved using theoretical and empirical observations in Sections 4.2
and 4.4. We provide empirical results throughout the paper, demonstrating the
real-world effect of our theory. The methodology of our experiments is laid out
in Section 2.4.
We finish by demonstrating that our algorithm achieves significantly better
prediction accuracy than other similar algorithms, both statistically and prac-
tically, in Section 5. We show that even when competing against a decision
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forest that uses a weaker definition of differential privacy (Rana et al., 2016),
our algorithm performs very well. This disputes any arguments that traditional
(ǫ, 0)-differential privacy is too strict to produce high quality results. We believe
our work is the first decision tree algorithm to simultaneously provide rigorous
privacy guarantees while also outputting a model with useable utility in real-
world applications. Other models achieve good results if the privacy budget is
high enough, but ours is the first to perform well with a realistic budget.
We contextualize our performance on various datasets with the results ob-
tained by Breiman (2001a)’s Random Forest algorithm. This algorithm is very
much non-private; that is, it makes no attempt whatsoever to protect the pri-
vacy of the people in the dataset. This of course means that it can produce more
accurate models than a private model can ever achieve, and the aim of our work
(and others like it) is instead to accomplish the much more difficult task of bal-
ancing two fundamentally adversarial concepts – knowledge discovery and indi-
vidual privacy – to produce a high quality model. We discuss the ramifications of
our findings in Section 6. A full implementation of our algorithm is available on-
line at http://samfletcher.work/code/ and http://csusap.csu.edu.au/∼zislam/.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we briefly provide the necessary background knowledge for
our work. We define and explain differential privacy and some of its properties
and mechanisms in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. We describe how decision trees are
built and used in Section 2.3. We then lay out the methodology used in all of
our experiments, which are presented throughout the paper to accompany the
theoretical work.
2.1. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a definition that makes a promise to each individual
who has personal data in a dataset x: “You will not be affected, adversely
or otherwise, by allowing your data to be used in any analysis of the data,
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no matter what other analyses, datasets, or information sources are available”
(Dwork & Roth, 2013). The output of any query performed on a dataset x will
be very similar to the output of the same query performed on dataset y, where
x and y only differ by any one individual. Note that this does not promise
that an attacker will not learn anything about an individual; only that any
information they do learn could have been learned even if the individual was
not in the dataset. More formal definitions, including some additional properties
of differential privacy, are presented below. Fig. 2 provides a high-level view of
how a user interfaces with a dataset x using differential privacy. We refer the
reader to Dwork & Roth (2013) for a more thorough introduction of differential
privacy.
We write the following definitions in terms of some query (i.e., function) f
submitted to a dataset x describing n records (i.e., individuals) from a universe
D. We define the distance between two datasets x and y using the Hamming
distance ||x − y||1, which equals the number of records that would have to be
added or removed from x before it is identical to y. If the Hamming distance
||x − y||1 equals 1, the datasets differ by only one record and we call x and y
“neighbors”. We denote the cardinality (i.e., size, or number of elements) of x
as |x|.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy (Dwork, 2006)). A query f is ǫ-differentially
private if for all outputs g ⊆ Range(f) and for all data x, y ∈ Dn such that
||x− y||1 ≤ 1:
Pr(f(x) = g) ≤ eǫ × Pr(f(y) = g) . (1)
The parameter ǫ can be considered as a “cost”, with multiple costs summing
together:
Definition 2 (Composition (McSherry & Talwar, 2007)). The application of all
queries {fi(x)}, each satisfying ǫi-differential privacy, satisfies
∑
i
ǫi-differential
privacy.
If the same query is submitted to multiple subsets of the data, with no
overlapping records, the costs do not need to be summed:
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Definition 3 (Parallel Composition (McSherry, 2009)). For disjoint subsets
xi ⊂ x, let query f(xi) satisfy ǫ-differential privacy; then applying all queries
{f(xi)} still satisfies ǫ-differential privacy.
In other words, the privacy cost of multiple queries applied to the same data
composes (i.e., is summed together), and a single query applied to different
subsets of data (with no overlapping records) can be asked in parallel at no
extra cost.
There are multiple ways to spend ǫ. One of the more common implemen-
tations of differential privacy is the Exponential Mechanism, which returns the
“best” discrete output with high probability:
Definition 4 (Exponential Mechanism (McSherry & Talwar, 2007)). Using a
scoring function u(z, x) : u→ R where u has a higher value for more preferable
outputs z ∈ Z, a query f satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if it outputs z with
probability proportional to exp ( ǫu(z,x)2∆(u) ). That is,
Pr(f(x) = z) ∝ exp
(
ǫ× u(z, x)
2∆(u)
)
. (2)
In the above definition, ∆(u) refers to the sensitivity of u (Dwork et al.,
2006). The sensitivity of a function is the maximum amount the output of the
function can differ by when considering two neighboring datasets x and y. The
most simple form of sensitivity ∆(u) is global sensitivity, defined as
Definition 5 (Global Sensitivity (Dwork et al., 2006)). A query f has global
sensitivity GS(f), where:
GS(f) = max
x,y:||x−y||1≤1
||f(x) − f(y)||1 . (3)
Our proposed algorithm uses a more sophisticated form of sensitivity, known
as smooth sensitivity, described below in Section 2.2.
2.2. Smooth Sensitivity
The global sensitivity of a function f is the theoretically largest difference
between the output of f(x) and f(y), for any possible dataset x and its neighbor
9
y. Instead, we can consider the local sensitivity of f , which takes into account
a specific x:
Definition 6 (Local Sensitivity (Nissim et al., 2007)). For f : Dn → Rd where
n, d ∈ N, and data x ∈ Dn, the local sensitivity of f at x (with respect to the ℓ1
metric) is
LSf (x) = max
y:||x−y||1≤1
||f(x) − f(y)||1 . (4)
Unfortunately this definition of sensitivity is not differentially private. Nis-
sim et al. developed a method for making it differentially private in 2007,
dubbing it smooth sensitivity:
Definition 7 (Smooth Sensitivity (Nissim et al., 2007)). The local sensitivity
of f , with distance k between datasets x and y, is
Sk(x) = max
y:||x−y||1≤k
LSf (y) . (5)
The smooth sensitivity of f can now be expressed using Sk(x):
S∗(f, x) = max
k=0,1,...,n
e−kǫSk(x) (6)
where ǫ is the privacy budget of f .
Smooth sensitivity allows for much less noise to be added while still achieving
differential privacy, by analyzing the actual dataset x instead of just assuming
the worst-case scenario.
2.3. Random Decision Trees
Our proposed technique involves building an ensemble of random decision
trees. We briefly go over the basics of random decision trees (Fan et al., 2003)
here. Decision tree algorithms are a non-parametric supervised learning method
used for classification (Han et al., 2006). They make no assumptions about the
distribution of the underlying data, and are trained on known labeled data to
correctly classify previously unknown data. The algorithm is what builds the
tree, and the resulting tree then acts as a model for making predictions.
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Figure 3: An example of a decision tree, with both discrete and continuous features, a depth
of d = 3, and a binary (“Yes/No”) class label.
Fig. 3 is an example of a decision tree. A decision tree is an acyclic directed
graph, built using top-down recursive partitioning of the training data. The
records in the dataset are recursively divided into subsets using “tests” in each
node of the tree. The test checks the value each record has for a chosen feature,
sending records to the child node that matches the value they have.
2.4. Experiment Methodology
We present empirical results throughout the paper, demonstrating how the
theory of our algorithm performs in practice. All our experiments are repeated
ten times, with each test using ten-fold cross validation, for a total of 100 results
that are then averaged. We include one standard deviation when presenting
the average result. The majority of our experiments use a privacy budget of
ǫ = 1. We also perform some experiments with ǫ = 0.01, 0.1, 0.2. In real-world
scenarios, the privacy budget given to a user very much depends on that specific
case; while a value of ǫ = 0.01 is sometimes suggested (Dwork & Roth, 2013;
Dwork, 2008), values as high as ǫ = 8.6 have been used in large, public projects
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2008). We also demonstrate in Section 5.1 how the
larger the size n of a dataset, the smaller ǫ can be without injecting too much
noise into the resulting trees; a phenomena well understood when implementing
differential privacy (Dwork & Roth, 2013; Dwork, 2008, 2011).
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Dataset Name n informative n random
SynthA 5 0
SynthB 10 0
SynthC 15 0
SynthD 10 5
SynthE 5 10
SynthF 5 5
SynthG 10 10
Table 1: Parameters for the synthetic datasets we use throughout the paper.
In our experiments involving real-world data, the data was collected from the
UCI Machine Learning Repository (Bache & Lichman, 2013). Details of these
datasets are presented in Table 4; other details are available on the UCI website.
Some of the real-world datasets we use have more than two class labels; Pen-
Written has ten class labels, and WallSensor, Nursery and Claves have four. One
of the advantages of our findings is that they are generalized to the multi-label
(i.e., non-binary) case, and so we include that case in our testing. In experiments
involving synthetic data, the data are generated with the sci-kit learn package
in Python (Pedregosa et al., 2011). The parameters that differentiate each syn-
thetic dataset are defined by the sklearn.datasets.make classification function.
We generate n = 30, 000 records for each dataset, with different numbers of
continuous features m, and use a balanced binary class feature. The parameters
using non-default settings are defined as follows:
n informative: “The number of informative features. Each class is com-
posed of a number of Gaussian clusters each located around the vertices of
a hypercube in a subspace of dimension n informative. For each cluster, in-
formative features are drawn independently from N(0, 1) and then randomly
linearly combined [into records] within each cluster in order to add covariance.”
(Pedregosa et al., 2011)
n random: The number of useless features, generated randomly.
The above parameters sum to the total number of features m generated for a
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dataset. Full details about the parameters can be found in the online documen-
tation for sklearn.datasets.make classification. Table 1 provides the parameter
values we use for the seven synthetic datasets used in our experiments.
In some experiments we compare our differentially private algorithm to “non-
private” algorithms. By “non-private” we mean classification algorithms that
do not attempt to protect privacy in any way – they simply try to maximize
prediction accuracy as much as possible. We present results for two non-private
algorithms in this paper; Breiman (2001a)’s Random Forest algorithm, and a
version of our proposed algorithm with the privacy protection removed. More
specifically, the non-private version of our proposed algorithm is exactly the
same as the private version except for the following: it uses a privacy budget
of ǫ = ∞ (i.e., it always outputs the correct answer); and it filters all the data
through every tree instead of a subset of data (explained further in Section 4.2).
Note that our aim is not to beat these non-private techniques (which is all but
impossible), but simply to use them as a reference point for how high prediction
accuracy can realistically get for the datasets we use.
3. Related Work
Performing data mining while preserving the privacy of the individuals de-
scribed in the data has been a topic of much research for nearly 20 years
(Brankovic & Estivill-Castro, 1999). Many techniques have been developed
to preserve privacy, such as k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) and noise addition
(Agrawal & Srikant, 2000; Yun & Kim, 2015). Decision tree algorithms have
been proposed in the past for both these types of privacy, such as Fung et al.
(2005, 2007) for k-anonymity and Islam & Brankovic (2011); Fletcher & Islam
(2015c) for noise addition, all aiming to keep the quality of the data mining
results as high as possible (Fletcher & Islam, 2014).
In 2006 a new paradigm was proposed: differential privacy (Dwork, 2006).
Many data mining algorithms have since been developed that harness differential
privacy (Ji et al., 2014; Sarwate & Chaudhuri, 2013; Zhu, 2014). Applications
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range from releasing private data using decision trees (Mohammed et al., 2011),
to kernel SVM learning (Jain & Thakurta, 2013), to clustering (Chen et al.,
2015). A querying language named PINQ has also been designed by Frank
McSherry at Microsoft, allowing users to query a dataset in similar way to
SQL, except that the outputs are differentially-private with no privacy expertise
required from the user (McSherry, 2009). In the following section, we focus in
on the differentially-private applications closest to our proposed technique.
3.1. Differentially Private Random Decision Trees
Several differentially-private decision tree algorithms have been proposed in
recent years (Friedman & Schuster, 2010; Jagannathan et al., 2012; Fletcher & Islam,
2015a,b; Rana et al., 2016). Of these, two of them took a similar approach
to our paper and used random decision trees to construct a decision forest
(Jagannathan et al., 2012; Fletcher & Islam, 2015b). The other three make
more traditional decision trees, using greedy heuristics in each node to con-
struct non-random trees (Friedman & Schuster, 2010; Fletcher & Islam, 2015a;
Rana et al., 2016). All of them achieve differential privacy by adding Laplace
noise (Dwork et al., 2006) to the counts of the labels in the nodes.1 While this
approach makes good use of parallel composition (Definition 3), it scales poorly
with multiple labels, since noise needs to be independently added to each label
count.
One of the disadvantages of using a splitting criteria in each node is that
the user must query the data to do so. This is an expenditure of the pri-
vacy budget that random decision trees avoid entirely. Random decision trees
have been shown to be competitive against greedy decision trees even in non-
private scenarios (Fan et al., 2003; Geurts et al., 2006), and especially appro-
priate in our private scenario. Empirically, this intuition has been validated
(Jagannathan et al., 2012; Fletcher & Islam, 2015b), with better prediction ac-
1The greedy decision tree algorithms also use the Exponential Mechanism to add noise
when choosing features in each node.
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curacy being achieved over their greedy counterparts (Friedman & Schuster,
2010; Fletcher & Islam, 2015a; Rana et al., 2016). Jagannathan et al. (2012)
improved prediction accuracy by taking advantage of some combinatorial rea-
soning developed by Fan et al. (2003), whereby the optimal tree depth is equal
to half the number of features, m/2. Fan et al. (2003) also empirically demon-
strated that 10 to 30 trees is often enough to achieve most of the possible
prediction accuracy potential, with increases in accuracy flattening out beyond
30 trees.
However, none of these techniques can take advantage of smooth sensitivity,
and thus add much more noise than is necessary to build a differentially-privacy
classifier. In fact, the amount of Laplace noise that needs to be added to a
frequency query (such as label counts) cannot be reduced by using smooth sen-
sitivity instead of global sensitivity; adding or removing one record can always
change a count by 1, even when considering a specific dataset x. What this
means is that submitting a frequency query to the dataset is an inherently ex-
pensive query, and should be avoided in favor of less expensive queries if possible.
We demonstrate that this is indeed possible by devising a less sensitivity query
that outputs a similar answer, resulting in less noise overall.
Aside from our proposed algorithm and Rana et al. (2016), none of the
above decision tree algorithms tested their algorithms with continuous fea-
tures. However Friedman & Schuster (2010) includes a technically correct but
costly (in terms of privacy) extension for handling continuous features, and
Jagannathan et al. (2012) states that their algorithm can be trivially extended
to handle continuous features by uniformly randomly selecting a split point
from the continuous feature’s domain. Randomly selecting a split point is the
same approach used by non-private random decision trees, and is the same ap-
proach we implement for our proposed algorithm. We compare our algorithm to
Friedman & Schuster (2010), Jagannathan et al. (2012) and Rana et al. (2016)
in our experiments, including the extensions for continuous features.
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4. Our Decision Forest Algorithm
We propose a decision forest algorithm that is tailored to the differential
privacy scenario. The complete algorithm can be seen in Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2. We summarize our algorithm with the following steps:
Step 1 Calculate the optimal tree depth (Section 4.3 and Line 3 of Algo-
rithm 1).
Step 2 Decide how many trees τ to build (Section 4.4 and user input in Algo-
rithm 1).
Step 3 Build a forest (Lines 4–7 of Algorithm 1) of τ random decision trees,
without needing to query the data (Section 2.3 and the BuildTree proce-
dure in Algorithm 2).
Step 4 Query the leaf nodes and output the majority class labels (Section 4.1,
Line 25 of Algorithm 2).
Output The decision forest model has finished being built. It can now be used
to classify the labels of unseen data (Section 2.3).
The construction of the random decision trees is the same as the conventional
approach (Fan et al., 2003; Geurts et al., 2006); features are randomly chosen
for each node. The BuildTree procedure in Algorithm 2 outlines the recursive
tree-building process. The novel parts of our algorithm are the following: how
we output the majority (i.e., most frequent) label of each leaf node (Section 4.1);
our efficient utilization of the privacy budget (Section 4.2); our proposed tree
depth, extending the non-private work of Fan et al. (2003) to handle numerical
features (Section 4.3); and the number of trees we build (Section 4.4).
Observe that in Step 4, the query constructed for each leaf node includes the
rules (i.e., tests) used by the nodes above the leaf node leading back to the root
node. This is how a differentially-private algorithm can achieve the “filtering”
process described in Section 2.3; since we can only access the data via queries,
we cannot hold the whole dataset in memory for the root node, and partition it
16
Algorithm 1 The proposed Differentially Private Random Decision Forest with
Smooth Sensitivity.
1: procedure BuildForest(Privacy budget ǫ, dataset x, number of trees τ , set of
continuous features S, set of discrete features R, class label C)
2: F ← {}
3: d← The optimal tree depth according to our Theorem 2.
4: for t = 1, . . . , τ do
5: T ← BuildTree(d, 0, S, R)
6: F ← F ∪ T
7: end for
8: F ← GetMajorityLabels(ǫ, x, C, F )
9: return F
10: end procedure
down through the tree. Instead, each leaf node’s query narrows the parameters
of the what training records are included so that they match the tests in the
root-to-leaf path. This is an engineering consideration more than anything (it
is less computationally efficient for example), with no effect on the algorithm’s
results, but is worth mentioning nonetheless.
Differential privacy is achieved by our algorithm only outputting the follow-
ing: the structure of the trees (which does not use the data); and the most
frequent label in each leaf node, which is done using the Exponential Mech-
anism. The user can then use the outputted labels from the leaf nodes in
whatever way they wish; differential privacy is immune from post-processing,
and differentially-private outputs can never incur additional privacy costs after
the fact (Dwork & Roth, 2013). More specifically, the user is free to use major-
ity voting; they can predict the label of a new record using the most common
predicted label from all the trees in the ensemble.
4.1. Outputting the Majority Label
When outputting details about leaf nodes, rather than trying to return
approximately-correct class frequencies like in Jagannathan et al. (2012) and
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Algorithm 2 A continuation of the algorithm presented in Algorithm 1.
1: procedure BuildTree(Maximum tree depth d, current depth d′, continuous features S,
discrete features R)
2: T ← {}
3: if d′ < d then ⊲ Termination criteria.
4: Uniformly randomly select a feature g from S ∪ R to split the current node with.
5: if g ∈ S then
6: Uniformly randomly select a splitting point p within the current domain of g.
7: Original domain of g ← Update the lower bound to p.
8: T ← T ∪ BuildTree(d, d′ + 1, S, R) ⊲ Left child node.
9: Original domain of g ← Update the upper bound to p.
10: T ← T ∪ BuildTree(d, d′ + 1, S, R) ⊲ Right child node.
11: else g ∈ R
12: B ← B − g ⊲ Discrete features can only be selected once in a root-to-leaf path.
13: for all gi ∈ g do
14: T ← T ∪ BuildTree(d, d′ + 1, S, R) ⊲ All child nodes.
15: end for
16: end if
17: end if
18: return T
19: end procedure
20: procedure GetMajorityLabels(Privacy budget ǫ, dataset x, class label C, forest F )
21: for t = 1, . . . , τ do
22: Query f(xt)← Scope query f to xt where xt is a disjoint subset of x = {x1, ..., xτ}
23: for all Leaf nodes L = {Li, ∀i} in tree Ft, F = {F1, ..., Fτ} do
24: f(xt ∩ Li)← Scope f(xt) with all the tests in the root-to-leaf path leading to
leaf node Li.
25: Majority label of Li ← c ∈ C outputted by the Exponential Mechanism using
f(xt ∩ Li) and ǫ, as well as the scoring function and smooth sensitivity proposed in
Theorem 1.
26: end for
27: end for
28: return F
29: end procedure
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Fletcher & Islam (2015b), we instead observe that this is more information than
is necessary in order to make a highly predictive classifier. To predict the class
label of future records, we only need to know the majority (i.e., most frequent)
class label in each leaf node (regardless of the number of times that label oc-
curred). By not “wasting” some of the privacy budget on information we do not
need, we propose querying the data with the Exponential Mechanism to only
output the (discrete) class label that is most frequent.
Definition 4 describes how the Exponential Mechanism is capable of return-
ing the discrete output of the most frequent class label in a leaf x. Our query
takes the same form as seen in the definition, where the query f will output the
most frequently occurring label in x with high probability. The precise prob-
ability is dependent on the scoring function u and the privacy budget ǫ. We
propose the following novel scoring function:
Theorem 1. Given the leaf x of a decision tree, the most frequent label can be
differentially-privately queried with the Exponential Mechanism (McSherry & Talwar,
2007). The scoring function used for this query can be the piecewise linear func-
tion:
u(c, x) =


1 c = argmaxi∈C ni
0 otherwise
, (7)
where nc is the number of occurrences of c in x. Each class label c ∈ C will
have a score: 1 if the label is the most frequently occurring label in the leaf; 0
otherwise.
The smooth sensitivity of u(c, x) is
S∗(u, x) = e−jǫ (8)
where ǫ is the privacy budget of the query and j equals the difference between
the most frequent and the second-most frequent labels in x, nc1 − nc2 .
Proof. The global sensitivity of the scoring function u seen in (7) is 1 because,
when considering any possible neighbors x and y, adding or removing any record
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has the potential to change which label(s) occurs most frequently:
GS(u) = max
x,y:||x−y||1≥1
max
c∈C
||u(c, x)− u(c, y)||1 = 1 . (9)
A label will change from a score of 0 to 1 when it appears equally as frequently
as the original most frequent label (at this point, 2 labels will be reporting a
score of 1). A label’s score will change from 1 to 0 when another label occurs
more frequently. In either case, the most that the scoring function u can change
by is GS(u) = 1.
The local sensitivity of u differs from the global sensitivity by taking into
account a specific x, rather than considering the worst theoretical outcome over
all possible x’s. From Definition 6 and Definition 7 we get
Sk(x) = max
y:||x−y||1≤k
max
c∈C
||u(c, x)− u(c, y)||1 . (10)
Because we are considering the actual frequencies of each label in x, we are
interested in how many records would need to be added or removed before a
different label achieves a score u of 1. This occurs when enough records with a
different label have been added to equal the most frequent label in x, or when
enough records have been removed from x to drop the most frequent label to
the same frequency as the next most common label. In either case, this first
will occur at a distance j from x, where j is the difference between the most
frequent and second-most frequent labels in x. Until then, for k < j, Sk(x) = 0.
When k = j, it is possible to have two labels with a score of u = 1. When k > j,
it is possible to have one or more labels with a score of u = 1. Regardless, for
k ≥ j, the local sensitivity is Sk(x) = 1. To summarize, the local sensitivity of
our scoring function u is 0 until y is sufficiently far away from x, at which point
the sensitivity becomes 1. We can represent this as
Sk(x) =


0 k < j
1 k ≥ j
; j = nc1 − nc2 , k ∈ N , (11)
where nc1 and nc2 are the frequencies of the most common and second-most
common labels in x, respectively.
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j S∗(u, x) when ǫ = 0.01 S∗(u, x) when ǫ = 0.1 S∗(u, x) when ǫ = 1.0
0 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
1 0.99004 0.90483 0.36788
5 0.95122 0.60653 0.00674
10 0.90483 0.36788 0.00005
50 0.60653 0.00674 1.93× 10−22
100 0.36788 0.00005 3.72× 10−44
500 0.00674 1.93× 10−22 7.12× 10−218
Table 2: Example smooth sensitivities of our scoring function u using Theorem 1, when
ǫ = 0.01, 0.1, 1.0. Note how j and ǫ have an equal impact on the result – increasing j tenfold
is the same as increasing ǫ tenfold.
To finish implementing Definition 7, we input Sk(x) from (11) into the
smooth sensitivity (6). We now find the value of k for which e−kǫSk(x) is
maximized. For k < j, we have
e−kǫSk(x) = 0 . (12)
Two other possible scenarios exist: k = j and k > j. Because Sk(x) is never
larger than 1, and e−kǫ becomes smaller as k gets larger, we can deduce that
e−kǫSk(x) is largest when k = j:
S∗(u, x) = max
k=0,1,...,n
e−kǫSk(x) = e−jǫ . (13)
The above proof holds in any scenario where the most frequent item in a set
is to be outputted. It also holds if the least frequent item is the desired output.
Using our proposed smooth sensitivity instead of the global sensitivity of 1,
we can guarantee that equal or less noise is added to all queries. In some cases,
the noise can be substantially lower. The smooth sensitivity of a query on data
x to return the most frequent label is dependent on only j and ǫ. We present
the worst-case scenario (i.e., when j = 0) as well as several other scenarios in
Table 2, using ǫ = 0.01, ǫ = 0.1 and ǫ = 1.0.
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Figure 4: The average prediction accuracy of two possible versions of our technique with a
privacy budget of ǫ = 1. One version uses our proposed smooth sensitivity of the scoring
function in the Exponential Mechanism. The other version uses the global sensitivity of the
scoring function (i.e., ∆(u) = 1).
In Fig. 4, we present the practical effect of our smooth sensitivity. We
present the prediction accuracy of our differentially-private random decision
forest on seven synthetic datasets (described in Section 5). Two scenarios are
demonstrated in the figure; when the Exponential Mechanism queries in the
leaf nodes use smooth sensitivity, and when they use global sensitivity. All our
other parameters, described in the following sections, use the default settings.
Note the substantial improvement in prediction accuracy when using our
smooth sensitivity – up to 26 percentage points in some cases, and never worse.
This matches what we expect from the theory, where even in the worse case
scenario, the smooth sensitivity is equal to the global sensitivity. Fig. 4 presents
the results for ǫ = 1, where Table 2 tells us that even with a modest j of 10, the
exponent of the Exponential Mechanism is improved 20,000-fold. For ǫ = 0.1,
the improvement would still be three-fold.
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4.2. Using Disjoint Data
When building multiple trees (say τ trees), there are two fundamentally
different ways we can use our privacy budget ǫ. One is to use composition
(Definition 2), where all the records in x (n = |x|) are used in every tree and
we divide ǫ evenly amongst the trees, ǫ′ = ǫ/τ . The other way is to use parallel
composition (Definition 3), dividing x into disjoint subsets2 evenly amongst the
trees (n = |x|/τ) and using the entire ǫ budget in each tree.
When deciding which method to use, let us consider the factors that affect
how noisy the output of our query proposed in Theorem 1 is. There are two
such factors: ǫ; and the sensitivity S∗(u, x), which is itself dependent on only ǫ
and j. When n is larger, each leaf node will contain more records on average.
Since we assume all the records in x are sampled from the same population, the
multinomial distribution will be approximately the same for both n = |x| and
n = |x|/τ number of records. Thus the relative frequency of both the number
of records, and the ratio of class labels, will be the same in each leaf node, and
j will change accordingly. We can write this as E[j] ∝ n.
One ramification of using all of x in each tree is that the smaller ǫ/τ privacy
budget affects both the numerator and denominator of the Exponential Mech-
anism, unlike j which only affects the denominator. This means that ǫ has a
larger impact on the result than j, and good-scoring labels have a higher chance
of being outputted by the Exponential Mechanism when disjoint subsets of x
are used:
exp
(
ǫ× u(z, x)
2 exp(−j/τ × ǫ)
)
> exp
(
ǫ/τ × u(z, x)
2 exp(−j × ǫ/τ)
)
(14)
when E[j] ∝ n. This effect is most prominent with smaller datasets where j is
small, before the exponential nature of the smooth sensitivity overpowers the
numerator by more than two or three orders of magnitude.
2When we refer to disjoint subsets of data, we are referring to a collection of records that
are sampled from the total dataset without replacement. Each record can only appear in one
disjoint subset.
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Figure 5: The (a) average prediction accuracy and (b) average smooth sensitivity of our
proposed algorithm, with and without using disjoint data in each decision tree. All other
parameters remain constant, using the default settings described in the other sections. The
budget is ǫ = 1 and the number of trees is τ = 100. Recall that lower sensitivity is better.
Due to space constraints, the horizontal axis in (a) starts at 50%.
Another factor to consider when choosing between the composition and par-
allel composition theorems is the fact that the correlation between j and n is not
one-to-one. If it was, that would imply that all leaf nodes that are empty (i.e.,
have no records in them) when n = |x|/τ will remain empty when n = |x|, when
instead the reality is that the sample size was simply not big enough for any
records to be in some of the leaf nodes. Therefore we expect that for some leaf
nodes, neither their support nor their class label proportions (and in turn, j)
will increase linearly with n. Of course, some previously empty leaf nodes now
have records in them, and the most frequent label outputted by the Exponential
Mechanism in these leaf nodes will no longer be purely random. The privacy
budget is only ǫ/τ in this scenario though, leading to the difference between
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“purely random” and “almost purely random” being trivially small for some of
these leafs. We empirically test the correlation between j and n, as well as the
number of empty leaf nodes, in Section 4.2.1.
Due to the above factors, we propose using parallel composition, and using
disjoint data in each tree with the full privacy budget. Fig. 5a empirically
demonstrates the improved prediction accuracy we see due to this decision. The
only parameter changed for the comparison is whether or not discrete subsets
of data are used in each of the 100 trees (and if not, ǫ is divided instead).
All other parameters use the default settings, described in the other sections.
This decision has the added benefit of substantially decreasing the computation
time of our algorithm, from O(n log n) to O(nτ log
n
τ ), where n is the number of
records in the dataset.
We see improvements of up to 18 percentage points when disjoint data is
used, and no losses by more than a fraction of one standard deviation. Aside
from the large improvements in prediction accuracy, we can make another obser-
vation from Fig. 5b; one that might be surprising at first. The average3 smooth
sensitivity (that is, exp(−jǫ)) is substantially better when disjoint data is used,
when initial intuition might tell us that j and ǫ should be offsetting one another
somewhat equally. Instead, we find that using all of the data in every tree does
not lead to an increase in the average j that is as large as the decrease in the
privacy budget when going from ǫ to ǫ/τ . We explore this phenomena further
in Section 4.2.1.
4.2.1. Empty Leaf Nodes
For almost any (non-uniform) distribution of feature values, records will start
clumping together in certain nodes, with other nodes receiving very few records.
This clumping becomes exacerbated for each non-uniformly distributed feature
3Note that we don’t include empty leaf nodes (which have a smooth sensitivity of 1) when
calculating the average smooth sensitivity, since 70 to 99.9% of the leaf nodes are usually
empty.
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tested in each level of a tree. As a tree grows larger, the chances of some leafs
having zero records in them also grows larger. We refer to leaf nodes with zero
records in them as “empty”. We use a simple example to demonstrate:
Example 1. Let us imagine we have a dataset made of m features and n records,
where each features has three discrete values that follow the normal distribution:
value v1 contains 68% of the records; value v2 contains 95%− 68% = 27%; and
value v3 has the remaining 100%− 95% = 5% of the records. Let us further as-
sume that all m features are independent, to simplify the simulation. If we were
to build a tree of depth m/2 with these m features, we would have a tree with
3m/2 leaf nodes. Out of these leaf nodes, a single leaf would contain 0.68m/2×n
records, and
(
m/2
2
)
−1 other leaf nodes would contain proportions of records that
were multiplications of 0.68 and 0.27 (such as 0.68 × 0.68 × 0.27 × . . .). Con-
versely, there would be a leaf with 0.05m/2×n records in it; using a conservative
m = 10, this would require a dataset of size n = 3, 200, 000 for there to be even
one record in this leaf.
In our experiments, using both synthetic and real-world data, over 85% of
the leaf nodes in any non-trivial tree are usually empty. By virtue of future data
being from the same distribution as the training data, however, these empty leaf
nodes are unlikely to be visited by future records. Any records that do finish
at an empty leaf node will be predicted to have a class label that is randomly
chosen with uniform probability (due to all labels having a score of 0 in the
Exponential Mechanism). We consider this to be less damaging than the same
scenario in Jagannathan’s implementation of a differentially private random de-
cision tree (Jagannathan et al., 2012), where labels with a frequency of zero still
have Laplace noise added to them. In an empty leaf node in Jagannathan’s im-
plementation, where every label reports a purely random frequency (because the
true frequencies are zero), highly confident predictions could be falsely created.
Our empirical results are presented in Table 3. Note how when the data is
divided among more trees, the number of empty leaf nodes always increases, as
we would expect. This supports the observation we made with Fig. 5b: j does
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Dataset
Total No.
of Records
Tree
Depth
% of Empty
Leafs (1 tree)
% of Empty
Leafs (30 trees)
SynthA 30000 5 49.8± 12.8 68.5± 2.0
SynthB 30000 8 79.1 ± 6.3 90.3± 0.7
SynthC 30000 12 95.0 ± 1.5 98.5± 0.1
SynthD 30000 12 95.7 ± 1.3 98.5± 0.1
SynthE 30000 12 63.3 ± 1.8 73.7± 0.1
SynthF 30000 8 79.2 ± 6.2 89.9± 0.7
SynthG 30000 15 98.7 ± 0.4 99.7± 0.0
WallSensor 5456 4 48.6± 12.3 65.1± 2.1
PenWritten 10992 12 92.4 ± 1.2 97.7± 0.1
GammaTele 19014 8 86.2 ± 3.8 93.5± 0.5
Adult 30162 9 99.8 ± 0.0 99.9± 0.0
Mushroom 5644 11 99.9 ± 0.0 99.9± 0.0
Claves 10800 8 0.0± 0.0 28.7± 0.4
Nursery 12960 4 0.2± .0.5 7.2± 0.8
Table 3: The percentage of leaf nodes with no records in them, when building random trees
with eight real-world datasets and seven synthetic datasets. We present the results for one
tree and 30 trees, when using disjoint data in each tree, and a privacy budget of ǫ = 1. We
include one standard deviation for each result. The depth of the trees is defined by a novel
theorem that we present in Section 4.3.
not increase at the same ratio that n does, because many of the extra records are
going to previously empty leaf nodes. While this means these previously empty
leaf nodes are no longer outputting a most frequent label with pure randomness,
Fig. 5b shows us that this reduction in randomness does not negate the increase
in randomness in all leaf nodes from dividing the privacy budget into ǫ/τ .
4.3. Tree Depth
An existing theory about the depth of a random tree was introduced in
Section 3.1, where the ideal depth is half the number of features m/2. However
this assumes that the features can only be selected once in any root-to-leaf path
(by virtue of being discrete features, where all values are separated by the first
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node that selects the feature). Continuous features, on the other hand, can be
randomly chosen any number of times (since there are many more split points
remaining that could separate the records). The reasoning behind wanting to
test m/2 unique features in each path still stands, but the probability of this
happening at a depth of exactlym/2 is much lower if all (or some) of the features
are continuous. We propose a new tree depth using the analysis below.
Theorem 2. The expected number X of continuous features s not tested, on
any particular root-to-leaf path of depth d, is equal to
E[X |d] = s
(
s− 1
s
)d
, (15)
where each tested features is uniformly randomly selected with replacement. Us-
ing the same combinatorial reasoning used in Fan et al. (2003) and described in
Section 3.1, the optimal tree depth is therefore
d = argmin
d:X<s/2
E[X |d] . (16)
Proof. Our proof is the same as the proof for estimating the number of empty
bins in the “Balls and Bins” problem (a companion of the famous “Birth-
day Paradox” and “Coupon Collector Problem” (Flajolet & Sedgewick, 2009)).
Each continuous feature is a “bin”, and each node in a root-to-leaf path in a
tree is a “ball”. Each time we randomly select an feature (i.e., throw a ball), it
has an equal chance of being (i.e., landing in) any of the s continuous features
(i.e., bins).
Let the random variable X equal the number of features never selected in
a root-to-leaf path. For each feature i, Xi equals 1 if i is never selected, and 0
otherwise. Since E[X ] = E[
s∑
i
Xi] =
s∑
i
E[Xi], we only need to know E[Xi] to
know the expected number of features that are never selected. For any feature
i, the probability that it will not be selected in a node is equal to the probability
that any of the other s − 1 features will be selected, which equals s−1s . If we
repeat this for all d nodes, where each selection is independent of the others,
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Dataset
Continuous
Features
Discrete
Features
Depth
SynthA 5 0 5
SynthB 10 0 8
SynthC 15 0 12
SynthD 15 0 12
SynthE 15 0 12
SynthF 10 0 8
SynthG 20 0 15
WallSensor 4 0 4
PenWritten 16 0 12
GammaTele 10 0 8
Adult 6 8 9
Mushroom 0 22 11
Claves 0 16 8
Nursery 0 8 4
Table 4: The depths calculated using Theorem 2 for the synthetic and real datasets used in
our experiments.
the probability that i is never selected is equal to ( s−1s )
d. Thus E[Xi] = (
s−1
s )
d,
and E[X ] = s( s−1s )
d.
If a dataset has r discrete features in addition to the s continuous features,
we add r/2 to the depth d defined by Theorem 2 as per the combinatorial
reasoning of Fan et al. (2003). Table 4 shows the tree depths for the datasets
we use in our experiments, calculated using Theorem 2.
Fig. 6 provides empirical evidence of the prediction accuracy gained when
using our proposed depth, rather than simply m/2. We also present the pre-
diction accuracy when a depth of m is used, to demonstrate that increasing
the depth arbitrarily does not necessarily increase the accuracy (it actually de-
creases the accuracy for all but one dataset). Our proposed depth provides
higher prediction accuracy than m/2 for all datasets, by at least 2 percentage
points and as much as 30 percentage points. For most datasets, we also see less
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Figure 6: The average prediction accuracy of our proposed algorithm for three different tree
depths: m/2; our proposed depth defined by Theorem 2; and m. The results are for when the
budget is ǫ = 1.
variance in the standard deviation when using our proposed depth over m/2, as
expected from the analysis done by Fan et al. (2003).
4.4. Number of Trees
Another factor in the implementation of a differentially private decision for-
est with random decision trees is the number of trees to build. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8
present empirical results for a range of forest sizes (i.e., number of trees). Fig. 7
shows the average prediction accuracy results for our seven synthetic datasets,
for both ǫ = 0.2 and ǫ = 1.
From these results, one observation is that having more trees is not neces-
sarily better. Indeed, for ǫ = 0.2 especially, we can see that there appears to
be a “sweet spot” at 30 to 100 trees where prediction accuracy is highest. As
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Figure 7: The average prediction accuracy of our proposed algorithm when building different
numbers of trees, with privacy budget (a) ǫ = 0.2 and (b) ǫ = 1.0. Due to space constraints,
the horizontal axis starts at 50%. We recommend building 100 trees when using our algorithm,
seen in blue.
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Figure 8: The percentage of non-empty leaf nodes that had their majority (i.e., most frequent)
labels changed by the Exponential Mechanism, when building different numbers of trees with
a budget of ǫ = 1.
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ǫ increases, this sweet spot increases to 100 to 300 trees. Another observation
we can make is that for 1 to 10 trees, the prediction accuracy results vary by
a lot more compared to when there are more trees, seen by the larger standard
deviations. This is something we expect to see, given the high randomness in
the construction of the trees. If we only build one random tree, there is a much
higher chance of us getting very lucky or very unlucky when predicting future
labels than there is if we build many random trees. With many trees, we can use
the predictions made by each tree as votes and select the most voted class label
as our prediction. The variance is also reduced due to the disjoint data used in
each tree; using bootstrap (i.e. selected with replacement) samples is strongly
advised for even non-private trees (Breiman, 2001a; Geurts et al., 2006). While
we cannot use sampling with replacement in our algorithm due to the privacy
costs, sampling without replacement (which is what disjoint subsets achieves)
reduces over-reliance on individual records, and thus variance, in the same way
(Breiman, 2001a). Having more trees also helps average out the noise caused
by the Exponential Mechanism. Of course, at some point having more votes no
longer provides a benefit, and in the case of our differentially private scenario
there is the added downside of having to divide up the data into more disjoint
subsets – a problem that non-private decision forests are immune from, since
they can sample with replacement.
Fig. 8 portrays a different perspective on the same scenario as Fig. 7. Fig. 8
tells us that larger numbers of trees cause more (non-empty) leaf nodes to out-
put a label that differs from the actual most frequent label. In other words,
more most frequent label outputs are “flipped” to an incorrect label due to the
Exponential Mechanism. This is because the disjoint subsets of data are smaller
when more trees are generated, which decreases the average size of j in each of
the leaf nodes, which decreases the probability of the Exponential Mechanism
outputting the label with the highest score. Interestingly though, the propor-
tion of incorrect predictions being caused to preserve privacy remains around
5 to 20%, even with 30,000 records being split among 100 trees. This means
that 80% of the predictions are as accurate as possible, given the training data.
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With 100 trees, each unseen record has 100 votes on what its label is, and at
least 80% of the votes (from non-empty leaf nodes) are likely to be correct.
Even if the unseen record falls into a lot of empty leaf nodes, 100 votes is a
large enough sample that the random votes cast by empty leaf nodes will cancel
each other out in most cases. These findings are supported by the prediction
accuracy results seen in Fig. 7. This figure demonstrates that very good predic-
tion accuracy is possible, with many datasets achieving 85% to 90% accuracy
in Fig. 7a when using 100 trees. Given that this is under the strict conditions
required to protect privacy, these results are very promising.
For all of the above reasons, and from further testing with additional forest
sizes and epsilon values which agreed with the observations seen in Fig. 7 and
Fig. 8, we recommend building 100 random trees with our algorithm.
5. Additional Experiments
Aside from the experiments included throughout Section 4, we present some
other results here. In Section 5.1 we demonstrate that with larger datasets,
much smaller privacy budgets are viable, and that larger privacy budgets cause
the classifier quality to become asymptotically close to a non-private classifier.
In Section 5.2 we compare our algorithm to similar algorithms, introduced in
Section 3.1.
5.1. Scaling with Dataset Size and Privacy Budget
To save on computation time we perform our experiments with small datasets,
with 30,000 records in our synthetic datasets and 5,456 to 30,162 records in our
real-world datasets. To compensate for this, we use a relatively large privacy
budget of ǫ = 1 for most of our experiments. Fig. 9 demonstrates why we can
do this: one of the advantages of differential privacy is that it scales very well,
adding less noise the more data there is (Dwork & Roth, 2013). In other words,
a sample of 3,000,000 records with ǫ = 0.1 can achieve comparable results to a
sample of 30,000 records when ǫ = 1.0, as seen in Fig. 9. What privacy budget
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Figure 9: The average prediction accuracy of our proposed algorithm, when applied to dataset
SynthF with different numbers of generated records n. The results of three privacy budgets
are shown, ǫ = 0.01, 0.1, 1.0.
is actually acceptable for any particular scenario in the real world depends very
much on the specifics of the scenario. For example, a large public project was
able to use a privacy budget of ǫ = 8.6 (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008).
Differential privacy, and therefore our proposed technique, also scales well
with larger privacy budgets, as seen in Fig. 10. Here we can see that as ǫ
increases, our differentially-private technique gets asymptotically close to a non-
private version of our technique (described in Section 2.4). We include Breiman
(2001a)’s Random Forest technique to act as a reference point.
5.2. Comparisons with Other Techniques
We implement the following differentially private decision tree algorithms,
using all of their recommended parameters: Jagannathan et al. (2012)’s (hence-
forth called JPW); Friedman & Schuster (2010)’s (henceforth called FS); and
Rana et al. (2016)’s (henceforth called RGV). Since RGV uses a weaker form of
differential privacy, we first compare with the algorithms using the same defini-
tion as us: JPW and FS. JPW heuristically recommends a forest size of 10 trees
(Jagannathan et al., 2012), while FS only builds one tree (Friedman & Schuster,
2010). For tree depth, JPW use a depth of d = min(m/2, logb n − 1) where b
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Figure 10: The average prediction accuracy of our private technique as ǫ increases for the
Adult dataset, approaching the prediction accuracy of a non-private extremely random forest,
with all the same parameters as our technique except that no noise is added to the most
frequent labels. We also include the prediction accuracy of Breiman (2001a)’s Random Forest
as context.
is the average domain size of the features; FS uses a depth of d = 5. We then
run both of their techniques, as well as ours, on seven synthetic datasets and
seven real-world datasets with ǫ = 1. We also run Breiman (2001a)’s Random
Forest technique on each of the datasets, to act as a non-private benchmark.
While comparing to a technique that completely disregards privacy is obviously
unfair, it provides context about the prediction accuracy that is possible under
more optimal conditions for each dataset. The results are presented in Fig. 11.
All of the results reported in this section are statistically significant. Using
the Wilcoxon signed rank test (since we cannot assume that the results are nor-
mally distributed), we find that the differences between our technique and JPW,
our technique and FS, and our technique and RGV are statistically significant
for all datasets. The weakest significance is between our technique and FS for
the GammaTele dataset, with a p-value of 0.000057.
The last three real-world datasets presented in Fig. 11 have discrete features
only. Both of the other papers performed their experiments with only discrete
features, and FS greatly prefers them due to continuous features being much
more inefficient with the privacy budget (Friedman & Schuster, 2010). Our only
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Figure 11: The average prediction accuracy of three differentially-private decision tree al-
gorithms with ǫ = 1: our proposed technique, JPW (Jagannathan et al., 2012), and FS
(Friedman & Schuster, 2010). We also provide the prediction accuracy of Breiman (2001a)’s
(non-private) Random Forest for context, portrayed as an outlined bar.
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Figure 12: The average area under the ROC curve of our algorithm, compared to
Jagannathan et al. (2012)’s private JPW and Breiman (2001a)’s non-private Random For-
est, when ǫ = 1.
loss out of all datasets comes from one of these discrete datasets, Claves, where
JPW achieves 2.5% better prediction accuracy on average.
We beat both techniques in all other cases, both when using discrete data
and continuous data. While some improvements are minor (3.5% in the case of
the Adult dataset against JPW), others are very large; more than 35% against
both JPW and FS for SynthA. We often achieve more than a 10% improvement
over JPW for other datasets, and 30% over FS.
Of course, the process of adding noise to query outputs to preserve privacy
means that performing better than a technique that makes no effort to preserve
privacy is all but impossible. We can see this in Fig. 11, where Breiman (2001a)’s
Random Forest technique always achieves betters prediction accuracy. However,
our technique performs almost as well for some synthetic datasets, as well as
Adult, Mushroom and Nursery.
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Figure 13: The average F1 score of our algorithm, compared to Jagannathan et al. (2012)’s
private JPW and Breiman (2001a)’s non-private Random Forest, when ǫ = 1.
Rather than relying solely on prediction accuracy to measure the effective-
ness of our algorithm, Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 present results for AUC (Area Under
the ROC Curve) (Hanley & McNeil, 1982) and F1 score (sometimes called F-
measure) (van Rijsbergen, 1979) respectively. AUC and F1 score work best on
datasets with binary labels, so we limit the figures to just those datasets. When
calculating the true and false predictions for the positive and negative labels,
we consider the least frequent class label to be the positive case. Fig. 12 and
Fig. 13 show that our algorithm out-performs JPW in 11 of the 20 results, ties
in eight results (if we consider being within one standard deviation of each other
a tie) and only loses in one result. This supports the findings of Fig. 11, where
JPW only beat us once, and by less than one standard deviation.
RGV is a little different; they propose a weakened definition of differential
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privacy, and prove that a large ensemble of trees4 can be made weakly differen-
tially private with high utility. Put briefly, their differential privacy definition
protects individuals from their feature values being leaked, but not from their
presence in the dataset being leaked. RGV uses the entire privacy budget in
each tree, and determines how many trees can be built based on a series of
formulas provided in their paper (Rana et al., 2016). We run their technique
with ǫ = 1 on the seven synthetic datasets and three real-world datasets (their
paper only provides formulas for datasets with binary classes). The number of
trees ranges from 110 to 1385 trees, depending on the dataset. We compare
our strictly differentially private algorithm to their weakly differentially private
algorithm in Fig. 14.
Even when competing against a less private algorithm, we see in Fig. 14 that
our algorithm still performs well. In fact we beat RGV in five cases, lose in four
cases, and tie for the Adult dataset. Our accuracy improvements range from
1.5% to 13.0%, and RGV’s accuracy improvements range from 1.2% to 6.2%.
This result is quite impressive given the unfair comparison, and challenges the
notion that strict, (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy (Dwork & Roth, 2013) is too strict
for high-quality data mining to be possible (Rana et al., 2016; Hu et al., 2015).
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes and explores a new method for differentially privately
outputting the most (or least) frequent item in a set, using smooth sensitivity.
We apply these findings to a random decision forest framework and achieve
substantially higher accuracy than the state-of-the-art (Friedman & Schuster,
2010; Jagannathan et al., 2012; Fletcher & Islam, 2015a,b; Rana et al., 2016).
We also extend the work done by Fan et al. (2003) to calculate the optimal
depth for a random decision tree when using continuous features.
Each subsection in Section 4 explores a component of our algorithm, leading
4Each tree in RGV is built similarly to FS, with some modifications.
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Figure 14: The average prediction accuracy of our technique compared to RGV (Rana et al.,
2016) when ǫ = 1. Note that RGV uses a weaker definition of differential privacy.
to several novel conclusions that improve the utility of differentially private
random decision forests. Each theoretical conclusion is coupled with empirical
results, demonstrating the benefits of the theory when put into practice. Finally
in Section 5, combining all the improvements made by the previous subsections,
we see that differentially private decision trees can be made from real-world data
to create a highly accurate classifier, while simultaneously protecting the privacy
of every person in the data. We also demonstrated in Section 5.2 that weakening
the definition of differential privacy is not necessary in order to achieve good
utility.
Section 5.1 demonstrates that with enough data, even very small privacy
budgets are enough to make an accurate classifier. A user would not even have
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to use their entire budget on just our classifier, but can instead ask many other
queries in addition to outputting our efficient classifier. On the other end of
the spectrum, given enough privacy budget, a useful classifier can be built from
very little data. Fig. 9 demonstrates that with a budget of ǫ = 1, 30,000 records
is all that is needed to make a classifier with over 85% predictive accuracy.
Our findings in Section 4.1 are quite generalizable; now that it has been
proven that the smooth sensitivity of queries that output the most (or least)
frequent item in a set is e−jǫ, future research (of both ourselves and others)
can explore constructing other applications with similar queries. Many machine
learning domains can take advantage of queries that output the most frequent
item, such as frequent pattern mining (Bhaskar et al., 2010).
We hope that our findings on smooth sensitivity, disjoint data and tree
depth with continuous features aid researchers in their future work, and that
our high-accuracy classifier aids data scientists in building differentially private
applications.
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